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Abstract
This article studies the use of different distribution channels as
an instrument of price discrimination in credence goods markets. In
credence goods markets, where consumers do not know which qual-
ity of the good or service they need, price discrimination proceeds
along the dimension of quality of advice offered. High quality ad-
vice and appropriate treatment is provided to the most profitable
market segment only. Less profitable consumers are induced to de-
mand a treatment without a serious diagnosis. If consumers differ
in the probabilities of needing different treatments some consumers
are potentially overtreated. By contrast, under heterogeneity in the
valuations of a successful intervention some consumers are potentially
undertreated. Our results help to explain the casual observation that
in the early phase of the IT industry only low quality equipment was
distributed via warehouse sellers while today it is quite common to
see high quality equipment at discounters.
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1 Introduction
At the dawn of the personal computer age, a serious user typically bought his
or her PC from an outlet that helped to choose the right equipment, while
the same person would go and purchase a “toy PC” for his or her offspring
at a warehouse outlet. As time changed, whereas university departments,
firms and many professionals (as architects, attorneys etc.) still buy from
outlets that offer some advice in choosing the right quality, no-frills ware-
houses sell “all-inclusive” high capacity PCs to the mass market. One has
the impression that warehouses, not offering any advice or help to choose
the efficient PC, switched from providing low quality/capacity equipment to
selling high capacity equipment, where high capacity PCs often carry many
features never used by a typical consumer.
This paper interprets the market behavior of the IT industry as a man-
ifestation of second degree discriminatory pricing in a market for credence
goods. In credence goods markets, where consumers do not know which qual-
ity of the good or service they need, price discrimination proceeds along the
dimension of quality of advice offered. High quality advice and appropriate
treatment is sold to the most profitable market segment only. Less profitable
consumers are induced to demand a procedure without a serious diagno-
sis. If consumers differ in the probability of needing different interventions
then low-cost consumers get high quality advice and appropriate treatment
while high-cost consumers are potentially overtreated ; that is, they are in-
duced to demand high quality equipment without a serious diagnosis. By
contrast, under heterogeneity in the valuation of a successful intervention
high-valuation consumers get efficient diagnosis and appropriate treatment,
while low-valuation ones are potentially undertreated ; that is, they are in-
duced to demand low quality equipment independently of the severity of their
problem.
The selling of IT equipment involves credence goods characteristics in
the sense that experts can help a customer to determine the cheapest capac-
ity available that enables him to carry out the tasks the customer wants to
use the equipment for. Also, in the IT industry there is discrimination in
the dimension of quality of advice offered there are PC manufacturers who
distribute their equipment through IT warehouses that offer only selected
qualities of equipment at a relatively low price and through specialized deal-
ers who offer the entire assortment as well as advice on choosing the right
quality. The explanation offered by the present analysis for the casual obser-
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vation that in the early phase of the IT industry only low quality equipment
was distributed via warehouse sellers while today it is quite common to see
high quality equipment at discounters is based upon the dominant hetero-
geneity among consumers In the early days of the IT industry the dominant
heterogeneity was in the valuation for a successful match while today the
dominant heterogeneity is in the quality that fits the intended needs best.
Let us detail our framework and findings. We set up our model in terms of
a single expert who offers a menu of tariffs. Consumers observe the menu and
decide under which tariff they wish to be served, knowing that the expert’s
behavior crucially depends on the type of tariff they choose. One menu option
the expert might offer is an “expert tariff” meaning that consumers can be
sure that if they choose this option they will get serious diagnosis and efficient
treatment. The expert might also offer different “non-expert tariffs” meaning
that consumers who choose such a tariff can be sure not to get a diagnosis
and only a limited array of treatment qualities. Later (in Section 5) we re-
interpret our model as one where a single producer uses different distribution
channels as a way to price discriminate among consumers. There we show
that the situation where a monopolistic experts offers a menu containing
“expert” and “non-expert” tariffs can be re-interpreted as a setting where a
monopolistic manufacturer chooses different distribution channels — expert
outlets and warehouse outlets — for her goods.
The single-expert model is as follows On the demand side of the market
there are many consumers. Each consumer (he) has a problem but does
not know how severe it is. He only knows the probability distribution over
problems and his valuation for a successful treatment.
On the supply side, there is a single expert (she) — later to be re-interpreted
as a single manufacturer.1 At the outset the expert posts a menu of tariffs.
Each tariff specifies a list of repair prices. Consumers observe the menu and
then decide whether to visit the expert. If a consumer decides for a visit,
he specifies the tariff under which he wishes to be served. Now the expert
performs a diagnosis and then recommends a treatment. If the customer ac-
1The relevant condition is not that a single expert/manufacturer monopolizes the mar-
ket, but rather that experts/manufacturers have some degree of market power. In a model
in which capacity is required to serve customers (cf. e.g. Emons 1997 and 2001, or
Richardson 1999) experts/manufacturers have market power (independently of the num-
ber of producers who compete for customers) whenever tight capacity constraints hamper
competition. Similarly, consumer loyalty, travel costs together with location, search costs,
collusion and many, many other factors might give rise to market power.
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cepts the expert provides the recommended treatment and charges the price
posted for it.
The expert seller has the opportunity to recommend and provide an in-
efficient treatment. Two varieties of inefficiency may arise in our model,
provision of a high quality repair when a simple treatment would have been
sufficient to solve the problem, and provision of a simple procedure when a
high quality intervention is needed to fix the problem. We refer to the former
kind of inefficiency as over-, to the latter kind as undertreatment. Overtreat-
ment results in a successful intervention while undertreatment does not.2
Whether the expert has the right incentive to perform a serious diagnosis
and to provide the appropriate treatment depends upon the type of tariff
under which a customer is served. If the intervention prices specified by the
tariff are such that providing one of the treatments is more profitable than
providing any of the others then the expert will recommend and provide the
most profitable treatment without a serious diagnosis. Only under equal
mark-up tariffs where the differences in the intervention prices reflect the
differences in treatment costs will the expert perform a serious diagnosis and
recommend the appropriate treatment. Consumers know that; that is, they
infer the expert’s incentives from the intervention prices.
We study two types of heterogeneity among consumers. First we look at
heterogeneity in the expected cost of efficient treatment. We show that with-
out price discrimination the expert may serve less than the efficient number
of consumers but whoever is served gets efficient diagnosis and appropriate
treatment. If price discrimination is permitted, the number of consumers
who get served increases but only low-cost consumers are treated efficiently.
High cost ones are potentially overtreated ; that is, they are induced to buy
a high quality intervention without a serious diagnosis. Secondly, we study
heterogeneity in the valuation of a successful intervention. In this case high-
valuation consumers are treated efficiently while low-valuation ones are po-
tentially undertreated ; that is, they are induced to demand a low quality
intervention without a serious diagnosis.
The intuition for our over- and undertreatment results is as follows If
perfect price discrimination were possible, the expert would provide high
quality diagnosis and appropriate treatment to all consumers. This follows
2Another kind of problem frequently studied in the literature on credence goods is
‘overcharging’, that is, charging for a more expensive intervention than provided. Over-
charging is ruled out in our model by the assumption that consumers are able to observe
and verify the intervention performed by the expert.
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from the observation that consumers infer the expert’s behavior from treat-
ment prices. So the expert cannot gain by cheating. Consequently the best
she can hope for is to appropriate the entire surplus generated by honest be-
havior. In the absence of information about the identity of consumers perfect
discrimination is impossible. With imperfect discrimination the expert sells
high quality diagnosis and appropriate treatment at a relative high expected
price to the most profitable market segment only. For the rest of the market
this policy is unattractive since the expected price is larger than the valua-
tion of a successful intervention. Offering efficient diagnosis and treatment
at a lower expected price to the residual demand is impossible because this
would induce the more profitable market segment to switch to the cheaper
policy. So, the expert offers in addition to the expensive efficient diagnosis
and treatment policy a cheaper but also less efficient one. This latter policy
is designed in such a way that it attracts the less profitable residual demand
while being unattractive for the ‘good’ segment of the market.
In the setting with heterogeneity in the expected cost, the ‘good’ segment
of the market is the one of low-cost consumers. Thus, this segment gets the
efficient diagnosis and treatment policy. And the rest of the market? It is
potentially overtreated. For low-cost consumers the overtreatment policy in
unattractive since their problem is most likely to be a minor one, implying
that buying the expensive efficient diagnosis and provision policy still entails
a lower expected cost than buying a major treatment at a bargain price.
Under heterogeneity in the valuation of a successful intervention the
‘good’ segment of the market is the segment of high-valuation consumers.
So, the expert skims off this segment with the efficient diagnosis and provi-
sion policy. And the residual demand consisting of low-valuation consumers?
It is potentially undertreated. The undertreatment policy is unattractive for
high-valuation consumers because they have more to lose if the procedure
fails.
Our undertreatment result stands in sharp contrast to the findings of
another credence goods paper. In a model in which capacity constrained ex-
perts provide procedures to consumers who differ in their valuation of a suc-
cessful intervention, Richardson (1999) finds that in equilibrium all treated
consumers are potentially overtreated.3 A closer look at his paper reveals
3To the best of our knowledge there are only two further contributions with heteroge-
neous consumers, one of them is the more verbal paper by Darby and Karni (1973), the
other the 1993 article by Pitchik and Schotter. In both papers heterogeneity is only used
to purify a mixed strategy equilibrium.
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that the driving forces behind the Richardson overtreatment and our under-
treatment result differ. Our (over- and undertreatment) results are driven
by the expert’s desire to induce self selection among consumers. By con-
trast, Richardson’s findings result from a lack of power to pre-commit to the
price of the major treatment. At the diagnosis stage the expert can tell the
consumer that the basic intervention is insufficient to cure his problem and
inform him about the additional amount he would have to pay if he accepts
an upgrade. The customer knows that the basic intervention might fail. He is
therefore prepared to pay some additional amount for a stronger treatment.
If this amount exceeds the difference in treatment costs (as it is the case
under Richardson’s assumptions) then the expert has an incentive to always
recommend a stronger treatment.4
Other credence goods papers analyze substantially different settings.5
Emons’s (1987 and 1993) work is similar to ours in that it assumes that
the type of intervention is verifiable and in that it studies the incentives of
experts to under- or overtreat consumers. It is different, however, in that
consumers are assumed to be homogeneous. Emons finds that whether the
market mechanism induces non-fraudulent behavior depends on the amount
of information consumers have at hand to infer the experts’ incentives to be
honest. Alger and Salanié (2002) study a homogeneous-consumer model in
which the degree of verifiability is a continuous variable. They identify an
equilibrium in which experts defraud consumers in order to keep them un-
informed, as this deters them from seeking a better price elsewhere. Pitchik
and Schotter (1987 and 1993), Wolinsky (1993 and 1995) and Taylor (1995)
assume that the type of intervention is not verifiable and analyze expert’s
temptation to overcharge homogeneous customers. Pesendorfer and Wolin-
sky (2003) investigate a model where effort is needed to diagnose a consumer
and where an expert’s effort investment is unobservable. Their contribution
focuses on the effect an additional diagnosis (by a different expert) has on
the consumer’s evaluation of a given expert’s effort.
Outside the credence goods literature our results have close analogies in
the literature on monopolistic screening. In a model in which consumers with
different tastes for quality (or service) have unit demands for a good, Mussa
and Rosen (1978) show that a monopolist who only knows the aggregate
4Here, remember that equal mark-ups are necessary to induce an expert to perform a
serious diagnosis and to provide the appropriate treatment.
5See Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2003) for a synthesis of some of the findings in this
area.
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distribution of tastes will in general offer a menu of price quality combina-
tions. As compared to the first best outcome, (i) the monopolist tends to
enlarge the range of qualities offered, and (ii) almost all consumers buy lower
quality products than would be socially optimal. There are several differ-
ences between the Mussa and Rosen model and the setting considered here.
First, while there is a natural order in the quality space in the Mussa and
Rosen model, there is only a partial order in this dimension in the credence
goods setting considered here. In particular, high quality in the Mussa and
Rosen model unambiguously corresponds to serious diagnosis and appropri-
ate treatment in the setting considered here. The unusual feature in the
case of credence goods is, that there are different (unordered) ‘lower quality
levels’. As discussed above, depending on whether customers differ in their
probabilities to need certain treatments or in their valuation for a successful
intervention or both determines whether and which type of low quality service
(‘no diagnosis and always a major treatment’, or ‘no diagnosis and always a
minor intervention’) is used as a screening device. Another difference to the
Mussa and Rosen model is that quality (i.e., a serious diagnosis) is not costly
in our model.6 As Acharyya (1998) has shown, Mussa and Rosen’s results
heavily depend on the cost of quality upgrades. In particular, if quality is
not costly, the monopolist will offer only one quality, the best available one,
as her optimal policy and the only source of inefficiency that remains is the
familiar monopoly pricing distortion. Only for the case of multiple demand
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2002) show that quality discrimination may take
place even if provision of quality involves no cost of any sort. As we will
see below, consumers can have unit demand and diagnosis can be costless in
the case of credence goods, and still the expert may refrain from diagnosing
some customer groups.
The next section introduces the basic version of the single-expert model.
In the basic version there are only two types of problem and two types of
procedures and consumers differ in the expected cost of efficient treatment
only. In Section 3 we explore the effects of price discrimination in the basic
model. Section 4 discusses several extensions/modifications. First, we extend
the basic model to allow for an arbitrary number of problems and arbitrary
number of interventions; then we modify our basic model to a setting where
6The rationale for assuming zero diagnosis cost is that, if the expert finds it profitable
to refrain from providing diagnosis to some consumers when diagnosis costs are zero, then,
a forteriori, she will do so with positive diagnosis costs.
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consumers differ not in the expected cost of efficient treatment but rather in
their valuation of a successful intervention; and finally we look at a setting in
which consumers differ in both dimensions, in their expected cost of efficient
treatment and in their valuation of a successful intervention. In Section 5 we
re-interpret the different tariffs offered in the single-expert model as different
distribution channels chosen by a monopolistic manufacturer. There, we also
revisit some of the modelling assumptions and discuss alternatives. Section
6 concludes.
2 A Basic Model of Credence Goods
On the demand side of the market there is a continuum with mass one of
risk-neutral consumers. Each consumer (he) has a problem that needs to be
treated. The consumer knows that he has a problem, but does not know how
severe it is. He only knows that he has an ex ante probability of gk to have
a problem of degree k.
On the supply side of the market there is a single risk-neutral expert
(she). Her task is to diagnose consumers, to recommend them a treatment,
and, if a consumer accepts, to provide the recommended treatment.
In the basic model of Section 3 there are only two degrees of problem,
a minor (k = 1) and a major (k = 2) one. Each of them can be efficiently
treated by exactly one treatment. We denote the type of treatment that
efficiently fixes a problem of degree k by ck. The less severe problem is less
costly to be treated. That is, if we denote the cost of the treatment that
efficiently fixes a problem of degree k by ck, then c1 < c2.7 The more expensive
treatment fixes either problem, while the cheap one is only good for the minor
problem.8
Table 1 represents the gross utility of a consumer given the type of treat-
ment he needs and the type he gets. If the type of treatment is sufficient, a
consumer gets utility vˆ. Otherwise he gets 0. To motivate this payoff struc-
ture consider a car with either a minor problem (car needs oil in the engine)
or a major problem (car needs new engine), with the outcomes being ‘car
7For convenience, both the type of treatment and the associated cost is denoted by c.
8In Section 4 we extend the basic model to allow for n > 2 degrees of problem (k ∈
{1, .., n}). There we assume that, for any k < l, problem k is less severe than problem l so
that ck < cl. A more expensive treatment fixes all problems cheaper treatments fix, while
the cheapest one is only good for the least severe problem.
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Customer’s utility Customer needs
c1 c2
Customer c1 vˆ 0
gets c2 vˆ vˆ
Table 1: Utility from a Credence Good
works’ (if appropriately treated or overtreated) and ‘car does not work’ (if
undertreated).9 The case of overtreatment is the lower left cell (with more
than two degrees of problem and more than two treatment qualities the case
of overtreatment is the lower left triangle), the case of undertreatment the
upper right cell. Note that overtreatment is not detected by the customer
(vˆ = vˆ) and hence cannot be ruled out by institutional arrangements. This
is not the case with undertreatment; it is detected by the consumer (vˆ > 0)
and might even be verifiable. In the present paper we assume that this is not
the case. This means that payments cannot be conditioned on the resolution
of the problem. However, consumers are assumed to be able to observe and
verify the delivered quality (they know and can prove in which row of the
table they are). Thus, payments can be conditioned on the type of treatment
provided.
Our consumers are heterogeneous. In the basic model of Section 3 we
assume that consumers differ in their probabilities of needing different treat-
ments, but receive the same gross valuation vˆ from a successful intervention.
More precisely, we assume that each consumer is characterized by his type
t and that a consumer of type t has the major problem with probability
gt2 = t and the minor one with probability gt1 = 1 − t. Consumers’ types
are drawn independently from the same concave c.d.f. F (·), with differen-
tiable strictly positive density f (·) on [0, 1]. F (·) is common knowledge,
but a consumer’s type is the consumer’s private information.10 For further
9Of course, not all credence goods have such a simple payoff structure. For instance, the
payoff for an appropriately treated major disease might differ from that of an appropriately
treated minor disease. Similarly, the payoff for a correctly treated minor disease might
differ from that of an overtreated minor disease. Introducing such differences would burden
the analysis with additional notation, without changing any of the results, however.
10Car owners know how they treat their vehicles and the associated risk of needing
certain repairs, auto mechanics know only the distribution. Similarly, patients know their
eating and smocking habits and the associated risk of getting certain diseases, doctors
only the distribution.
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use, we define Ct as type t’s expected cost of efficient treatment, i.e., Ct
=
P2
k=1 g
t
kck = c1 + t(c2 − c1).
Each consumer incurs a sunk cost c if he visits the expert independently
of whether he is actually treated or not. This cost represents the time and
effort cost incurred by the consumer in visiting a doctor, taking the car to a
mechanic, etc. Consumers are maximizers of expected utility. The utility to
a consumer who has been treated is his gross valuation as depicted in Table
1 minus the price paid for the treatment minus the sunk cost c. For further
use, we define v as a consumer’s valuation net of sunk cost, i.e., v = vˆ − c.
The utility to a consumer who has not been treated is his reservation payoff,
which we normalize to equal zero11, and the utility to a consumer who has
visited the expert but has decided not to receive the recommended treatment
is −c. By assumption, if a consumer is indifferent between visiting the expert
and not visiting the expert, he decides for a visit, and if a consumer who
decides for a visit is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the expert’s
recommendation, he decides for acceptance.
The expert maximizes expected profit. The expert’s profit is the sum of
revenues minus costs over the customers she treated. By assumption, the
expert recommends the appropriate treatment if she is indifferent between
recommending the appropriate and recommending the wrong treatment and
this fact is common knowledge among all players.12
The interaction between consumers and the expert is depicted in Figure 1.
This figure shows the game tree for the special case where the monopolistic
expert courts a single consumer whose type is known with certainty. The
variables vˆ, c, g1, g2, c1 and c2 are assumed to be common knowledge. At
the outset the expert posts take-it-or-leave-it tariffs. Each tariff specifies the
prices p1 and p2 for c1 and c2, respectively. In the special case covered by the
figure the expert posts a single tariff only. With heterogeneous consumers
the expert might want to post a menu of tariffs. The consumer observes
11Here, the implicit assumption is that the outside option is not to be treated at all.
Again, the car example provides a good illustration. A car may be inoperable for a
minor or a major reason, with the lack of treatment giving the same outcome (’car does
not work’) as undertreatment. The medical example behaves differently. For instance,
letting a cancerous growth go untreated is much different than letting a benign growth go
untreated. See Footnote 9 above, however.
12Introducing some guilt disutility associated with providing the wrong treatment would
yield the same qualitative results as this common knowledge assumption provided the effect
is small enough to not outweigh the pecuniary incentives.
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overtreatment undertreatment
(p1,p2)
out in
c1
r r
r
r
a a
a
a
expert posts
prices
consumer decides
whether to visit the
expert or not
nature deter-
mines severity
of problem
expert recom-
mends (and
provides if
accepted)
consumer
accepts or rejects
c2
c1 c1c2 c2
Figure 1: Game Tree for the Basic Model (t = t for all consumers, say).
the tariffs and then decides whether to visit the expert or not. If he decides
against the visit, he remains untreated yielding a payoff of zero for both
players. If he decides for a visit, he specifies the tariff under which he wants
to be treated.13 Then a random move of nature determines the severity of
his problem. Now the expert diagnoses the consumer. In the course of her
diagnosis she learns the customer’s problem and then recommends either the
cheap or the expensive treatment. Next the consumer decides whether to
accept or reject the recommendation. If he rejects, his payoff is −c, while
the expert’s payoff is zero. If the consumer accepts the expert provides the
recommended treatment and charges for it. The game ends with payoffs
determined in the obvious way. The extensive form for our model with a
continuum of heterogeneous consumers and with a menu of tariffs can be
constructed from this game tree in the usual way.
Throughout we restrict attention to situations where the following two
conditions hold
v > c2
13This move is absent in the figure where the expert posts a single tariff only.
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c ≥ c2 − c1
The first of these inequalities says that it is efficient to treat both types of
problem and the second inequality entails that expert and consumer are in
effect tied together once the diagnosis has been made.14 Relaxing this last
restriction complicates the analysis without generating qualitatively different
results (provided c > 0).15
This is the basic setup of our credence goods game. In Section 4 we extend
the model to allow for an arbitrary number of problems and an arbitrary
number of treatments. There we also analyze the setting where consumers
differ in their valuation for a successful intervention.
Throughout the paper we use the following notation A tariff (p1, p2) im-
plies incentives it provides for the expert to perform diagnosis and to provide
treatment. Three classes of tariffs are to be distinguished, tariffs that contain
a higher mark-up for the expensive treatment (p2− c2 > p1− c1), tariffs that
have a higher mark-up for the cheap treatment (p2−c2 < p1−c1), and tariffs
with equal mark-ups (p2 − c2 = p1 − c1). We denote tariffs in the first class
by ∆02, tariffs in the second by ∆10, and tariffs in the third by ∆12. As will
become clear below, only under tariffs where the differences in the interven-
tion prices reflect the differences in treatment costs (equal mark-up tariffs)
will the expert perform a serious diagnosis and recommend the appropriate
treatment. Under tariffs where the intervention prices depart from the equal
mark-up rule the expert will recommend and provide the most profitable
treatment without a serious diagnosis. That is, the expert will perform a
honest diagnosis and provide the appropriate treatment under a ∆12 tariff,
she will always recommend and provide the cheap treatment under a ∆10
contract and she will always recommend and provide the expensive treat-
ment under a ∆02 contract.16 For convenience we will often denote not only
a specific tariff but also the implied mark-up by ∆. That is, the term ∆
will then stand for the mark-up on the treatment that is provided under the
respective contract (∆ = max{p1 − c1, p2 − c2}).
14In Subsection 4.1. where there are n > 2 degrees of problem the relevant condition is
c ≥ cn − C0, in Subsection 4.2 where consumers differ in their gross valuation vˆ but have
the same g2 the relevant condition is c ≥ (1− g2)(c2 − c1).
15See Section 5 for a discussion.
16We use the terms tariff, price-vector and contract interchangeably.
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3 Price Discrimination in the Basic Model
Overtreatment
In this section we analyze the effects of price discrimination in our basic
model. Before beginning we present a benchmark result for a setting in
which the expert cannot price discriminate among consumers. Without price
discrimination the expert chooses equal mark-up prices and serves her cus-
tomers honestly. If the difference in the expected cost between the best and
the worst type is small relative to the efficiency gain of treating the worst
type then the expert serves all consumers. Otherwise prices are such that
some consumers do not consult her even though serving them would be ef-
ficient. This is nothing but the familiar monopoly-pricing inefficiency The
monopolistic expert would like to appropriate as much of the net gain from
treatment as possible but, because of heterogeneous consumers, she puts up
with the risk of losing some consumers in order to get a higher price from
the remaining ones. We record the monopoly pricing result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
consumers who differ in their probabilities of needing different treatments
only. Suppose the monopolistic expert cannot price-discriminate among cus-
tomers. Then, in the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), the expert
posts and charges equal mark-up prices (pk − ck = ∆ for k = 1, 2). If the dif-
ference in expected cost between the best and the worst type is large relative to
the efficiency gain of treating the worst type [c2−c1 > (v−c2)f(1)] then prices
are such that high-cost consumers decide to remain untreated (∆ > v − Ct
for t strictly higher than some t ∈ (0, 1)), while all other types visit the expert
(∆ ≤ v − Ct for t ≤ t) and get serious diagnosis and appropriate treatment.
Otherwise all consumers are efficiently served under equal mark-up prices
(∆ ≤ v − Ct for all t).
Proof. Obvious from the discussion below and therefore omitted.
The equal mark-up result is readily illustrated graphically. First notice
that under verifiability the expert’s incentives in performing diagnosis and in
providing treatments depend upon the type of tariff under which a customer
is served. If the intervention prices specified by the tariff are such that pro-
viding one of the treatments is more profitable than providing the other then
the expert will recommend and provide the more profitable treatment with-
out a serious diagnosis. So, if we fix the mark-up for the minor intervention
12
at p1 − c1 and increase the mark-up for the major intervention from 0 (as
it is done in Figure 2) then the expert’s incentives remain unchanged over
the interval (0, p1 − c1) she will always recommend and provide the minor
treatment at the price p1 = c1+∆10. Consequently, the expected utility of a
consumer of type t is constant in this interval at v−Ct− t(vˆ−c2+c1)−∆10,
where the term t(vˆ− c2+ c1) reflects the efficiency loss from undertreatment.
Similarly, if we start at p1−c1 and increase p2−c2 then the expert will always
recommend and provide the major treatment at the price p2 = c2 +∆02. So,
the consumer’s utility in this segment is v−Ct− (1− t)(c2−c1)−∆02, where
the term (1− t)(c2− c1) reflects the efficiency loss from overtreatment. Only
at the single point p2−c2 = p1−c1 =∆12 where the difference in the interven-
tion prices reflects the difference in treatment costs is the expert indifferent
between the two types of treatment and, therefore, behaves honestly.17 So,
at this point there is no efficiency loss and type t0s expected utility jumps
discontinuously upward to v − Ct −∆12.
Consumers infer the expert’s incentives from the intervention prices. So
the expert cannot gain by cheating. Consequently, the best she can do is to
post an equal mark-up tariff and to behave honestly. With equal mark-ups
the monopolistic expert is interested in two variables only, in the magnitude
of the mark-up ∆ = ∆12 and in the number of visiting consumers. The
result then follows from the observation that the expert’s problem is nothing
but the familiar monopoly pricing problem for revenue per customer ∆ and
demand curve D(∆) = F [(v − c1 −∆)/(c2 − c1)].18
For our next result we allow the expert to post more than one tariff.
Since consumers’ tastes differ, the monopolist might want to target a specific
tariff for each consumer or at least different tariffs for different consumer
groups. However, in the absence of information about the identity of each
consumer (the expert only knows the aggregate distribution of probabilities
17The assumption that it is common knowledge among players that the expert provides
the appropriate treatment whenever she is indifferent plays an important role in Proposi-
tion 1 in generating a unique PBE. Without this assumption there exist other PBE which
are supported by the belief that the expert deliberately mistreats her customers under
each equal mark-up vector - or, that the expert deliberately mistreats her customers un-
der equal mark-up prices that are too high. We regard such equilibria as implausible (see
Footnote 12 above) and have therefore introduced the common knowledge assumption
which acts as a restriction on consumers’ beliefs.
18That the condition (c2 − c1) > (v − c2)f(1) is necessary and sufficient for an interior
solution is easily verified by checking that the expert’s profit is an increasing function of
∆ at ∆ = v − c2 if and only if this condition is satisfied.
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Figure 2: Type t’s Expected Utility under Different Price Vectors
of needing different treatments) the expert must make sure that consumers
indeed choose the tariff designed for them and not the tariff designed for
other consumers. This puts self-selection constraints on the set of tariffs
offered by the monopolist. As our next result shows, the monopolist uses the
quality of advice offered as a self selection device.
Proposition 2 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
consumers who differ in their probabilities of needing different treatment only.
Suppose that the expert can price discriminate among consumers (rather than
being restricted to post a single tariff only). Then, in any PBE, the expert
posts two tariffs, one with equal mark-ups, and one where the mark up for
the major treatment exceeds that for the minor one.19 Both tariffs attract
customers and in total all consumers are served. Low cost consumers are
served under the former tariff and always get honest diagnosis and appro-
priate treatment; high-cost consumers are served under the latter and always
get the major treatment, sometimes inefficiently.
Proof. The proof proceeds in four steps. In Step 1 we first show that
any arbitrary menu of tariffs partitions the type-set into (at most) three
19The menu may contain some redundant tariffs too, i.e., some tariffs that attract no
consumers.
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subintervals delimited by cut-off values t10, t12 and t02 with 0 ≤ t10 ≤ t12 ≤
t02 ≤ 1 and either t12 = t02 or t02 = 1 (or both) such that (i) the optimal
strategy of types in [0, t10) is to choose a ∆10 tariff, (ii) the optimal strategy
of types in [t10, t12] is to decide for a ∆12 tariff, and (iii) the optimal strategy
of types in (t12, 1] is either to choose a ∆02 tariff (t02 = 1), or to remain
untreated (t12 = t02).20 Our strategy is then to show in Step 2 that an
optimal price-discriminating menu cannot have t10 = t12 (that is, there must
be an equal mark-up tariffwhich attracts a strictly positive measure of types),
to show next (in Step 3 ) that t10 = 0 whenever t10 < t12 (that is, the expert
has never an incentive to post a menu where both an equal mark-up tariff
and a tariff with a higher mark-up for the cheap treatment attract types),
and to show in the end (Step 4 ) that the expert has indeed always a strict
incentive to cover a strictly positive interval by a tariff with a higher mark-up
for the expensive treatment (t12 < t02 = 1).
Step 1 First note that any arbitrary menu of tariffs can be represented
by (at most) three variables, by the lowest ∆02 = p2 − c2 from the class of
∆02 tariffs (we denote the lowest ∆02 in this class by ∆l02), by the lowest
∆10 = p1 − c1 from the class of ∆10 tariffs (we denote the lowest ∆10 in this
class by ∆l10), and by the lowest equal mark-up ∆12 from the class of all
equal mark-up tariffs in the menu (denoted by ∆l12).21 To see this, note that
with n = 2 each possible price vector is member of exactly one of these three
classes, and that a customer who decides for a vector in a given class will
always decide for the one with the lowest ∆.22 An immediate implication is
that each menu of tariffs partitions the type-set into the above mentioned
three subintervals. This follows from the fact that the expected utility under
∆l02 is type-independent (implying that either t12 = t02 or t02 = 1 or both),
20The borderline types t10 and t12 are indifferent between the strategies of the types
in the adjacent intervals (whenever such intervals exist). Here note that we allow for
t12 = 1 (all consumers are served and no consumer chooses a ∆02 tariff), for t10 = t12 (no
consumer is attracted by a ∆12 tariff), and for t10 = 0 (no consumer is attracted by a ∆10
tariff). Price discrimination requires, however, that at least two of the three relations hold
as strict inequalities.
21An immediate implication of this observation is that successful price discrimination
requires that some types are mistreated with strictly positive probability. Why? Since at
least two tariffs must attract a positive measure of consumers and since only one of them
can be an equal mark-up tariff.
22Under a ∆02 tariff neither the consumer nor the expert cares about the associated p1.
All tariffs in the group that have the same ∆02 can therefore be thought off as being a
single tariff without any loss in generality. The argument for ∆10 tariffs is symmetric.
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while the expected utility under both the ∆l12 tariff and the ∆l10 tariff is
strictly decreasing in t, and from vˆ > c2− c1 (implying that the ∆l10-function
is steeper than the ∆l12-function).
Step 2 To see that t10 < t12, suppose to the contrary that t10 = t12.
Then t10 > 0, since t10 = t12 = 0 is incompatible with price-discrimination
(and since - by Proposition 1 - a non-price-discriminating expert will always
decide for a ∆12 vector). But such a menu is strictly dominated, since the
∆l10 vector can always be replaced by a vector with equal mark-ups of ∆12 =
∆l10 + g
t10
2 (vˆ − c2 + c1); the latter attracts exactly the same types as the
replaced one and yields a strictly higher profit.
Step 3 To see that t10 = 0 whenever t10 < t12, suppose to the contrary
that 0 < t10 < t12. Then the expert’s profit is strictly increased by removing
all ∆10 vectors from the menu. This follows from the observation that (by
the monotonicity of the expected utility − in t − under ∆12) all types in
[0, t10) switch to ∆l12 when all ∆10 vectors are removed from the menu, and
from the fact that the expected profit per customer is strictly higher under
∆l12 than under ∆l10 whenever 0 < t10 < t12, since ∆l12 ≤ ∆l10 is incompatible
with the shape of expected utilities (∆l12 ≤ ∆l10 implies that v −Ct −∆l12 >
v − Ct − ∆l10 − gt2(vˆ − c2 + c1) for all t > 0 contradicting t10 > 0). Thus,
t10 = 0 < t12 ≤ t02 ≤ 1. So, if price discrimination is observed in equilibrium
it is performed via a menu that contains two tariffs, one with equal mark-ups,
and one with a higher mark-up for the more expensive treatment.23
Step 4 We now show that the expert has always a strict incentive to post
such a menu. Consider the equal mark-up vector posted by the expert un-
der the conditions of Proposition 1. The mark-up in this vector is at least
∆12 = v− c2, in an interior solution even higher. First suppose that the mo-
nopolist’s maximization problem under the conditions of Proposition 1 yields
an interior solution (i.e., ∆12 > v − c2). Then the expert can increase her
profit by posting a menu consisting of two vectors, the one chosen under the
conditions of Proposition 1 and a ∆02 vector with p2 = v. The latter vector
guarantees each type an expected utility equal to the reservation utility of
0. Thus, all types that remain untreated under the conditions of Proposi-
tion 1 will opt for it since they are indifferent. Also, all types served under
the conditions of Proposition 1 still choose the equal mark-up vector since
v − Ct is strictly decreasing in t. Hence, since v > c2, and since all types
23The menue might contain some redundant vectors too, which can safely be ignored,
however.
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in [0, 1] have strictly positive probability, the expert’s expected profit is in-
creased.24 Now suppose that the monopolist’s maximization problem under
the conditions of Proposition 1 yields the corner solution ∆12 = v− c2. Then
again the monopolist can increase her profit by posting a menu consisting of
two tariffs, a ∆02 contract with p2 = v, and a ∆12 contract that maximizes
π(∆12) = ∆12F [(v−c1−∆12)/(c2−c1)]+ (v−c2)(1−F [(v−c1−∆12)/(c2−c1)]).
Since π(∆12) is strictly increasing in ∆12 at ∆12 = v− c2 an interior solution
is guaranteed.
Under the conditions of Proposition 2 the expert posts two tariffs, an
equal mark-ups to skim-off low-cost consumers and a less profitable overtreat-
ment tariff to serve the rest. Consumers served under the former tariff get
honest diagnosis and appropriate treatment, consumers served under the lat-
ter always get the expensive treatment, sometimes inefficiently.
Figure 3 illustrates the result. This figure shows how consumers’ expected
utility under different tariffs varies in the type. First notice that consumers’
expected utility under ∆02 (where the expert always provides the expensive
intervention) is type-independent, while the expected utility under both the
∆12 tariff (where the expert behaves honestly) and the ∆10 tariff (where the
expert undertreats the customer) is strictly decreasing in t. Next notice that
the ∆10-function is strictly steeper than the ∆12-function. This follows from
the observation that under ∆10 higher types have a higher probability that
the intervention fails (leading to a loss of vˆ) while under∆12 they have only a
higher probability to get charged for the more expensive treatment (leading
to an additional cost of c2 − c1 < vˆ). Finally remember from the discussion
of Figure 2 that if a ∆10 tariff, a ∆12 tariff and a ∆02 tariff simultaneously
attract customers (as it is the case in the situation depicted in Figure 3)
then the inefficient tariffs ∆10 and ∆02 must have lower mark-ups than the
efficient one. Consequently, a situation as depicted in Figure 3 can never arise
in equilibrium the expert could always remove the ∆10 tariff from the menu;
then all types in [0, t10) would switch to ∆12 and the expert’s profit would
be increased. Also, a menu where only a ∆10 tariff and ∆02 tariff attract
24Here note that the expert can do even better by increasing ∆l12. This follows from the
observation that the expert’s trade-off under the conditions of Proposition 1 is between
increasing the mark-up charged from the types in the segment of served customers and
losing some types to the unprofitable segment of not served consumers, while the trade-
off here is between increasing the mark-up charged from the types in the segment of
customers served under the more profitable equal mark-up vector and losing some types
to the segment of customers served under the less profitable ∆l02 vector.
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Figure 3: Type Dependent Expected Utilities with Ct = c1 + t(c2 − c1)
types can never be an equilibrium menu the expert could always replace
the ∆10 tariff by an efficient tariff such that the highest type attracted by
∆10 is exactly indifferent between ∆10 and ∆12; the ∆12 tariff would attract
exactly the same types as the replaced∆10 contract and yield a strictly higher
profit. So, if price discrimination is observed in equilibrium it is performed
via a menu that contains two tariffs, one with equal mark-ups, and one with
a higher mark-up for the more expensive treatment.
That the expert has indeed always an incentive to post such a menu
is easily seen. First suppose that some consumers remain unserved under
the conditions of Proposition 1. Then the expert can increase her profit by
posting a menu consisting of two vectors, the one chosen under the conditions
of Proposition 1 and a ∆02 tariff that leaves zero rents to consumers (p2 = v).
Since v > c2, and since all types in [0, 1] have strictly positive probability,
the expert’s expected profit is increased. Next suppose that the expert’s
maximization problem under the conditions of Proposition 1 yields the corner
solution ∆12 = v − c2. Then again she can increase her profit by posting a
menu consisting of two tariffs, a ∆02 contract with ∆02 = v − c2, and an
efficient tariff with ∆12 = v − c2 + ε. Still all consumers are served. Those
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served under ∆02 leave the expert with exactly the same profit as before,
those served under ∆12 are served more profitable. Hence, the expert’s profit
is again increased.
The equal mark-up in the tariff posted under the conditions of Proposi-
tion 2 is strictly higher than that in the tariff of Proposition 1. This follows
from the observation that the expert’s trade-off is between increasing the
mark-up charged from the types in the segment of served customers and
losing some types to the unprofitable segment of not served consumers in
the latter case, while the trade-off here is between increasing the mark-up
charged from the types served under the more profitable equal mark-up vec-
tor and losing some types to the segment of customers served under the
less profitable second vector. So, some consumers who always get honest
diagnosis and appropriate treatment under the conditions of Proposition 1,
get (with strictly positive probability) the wrong treatment when the expert
can price discriminate among consumers. So, if the difference in expected
cost between the best and the worst type is small (so that the monopolist
serves all consumers if price discrimination is not permitted) then allowing
discrimination unambiguously reduces efficiency. On the other hand, when
some consumers are excluded under the conditions of Proposition 1, then
there is a trade-off between increasing the number of treated consumers and
serving the treated customers efficiently. Overall efficiency might increase
or decrease with price discrimination depending on the shape of the distri-
bution function F (·), the valuation v and the cost differential c2 − c1. As
our next result shows, the mass of consumers that are efficiently served un-
der non-discrimination and inefficiently under discrimination increases in the
net valuation v and decreases in the cost differential c2 − c1. At the same
time, the mass of consumers that are not served under non-discrimination
and served under discrimination decreases in the net valuation and increases
in the cost differential. So, price discrimination is ceteris paribus more likely
to be efficiency enhancing if consumers’ valuation of an efficient treatment is
small and if the cost differential is large.
Proposition 3 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
with consumers who differ in their probabilities of needing different inter-
ventions only. Let 1 − F (ta12) stand for the mass of consumers that are
not served under non-discrimination and served under discrimination. Sim-
ilarly, let F (ta12)− F (tb12) stand for the mass of consumers that are effi-
ciently served under non-discrimination and inefficiently under discrimina-
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tion. Then 1 − F (ta12) increases in c2 and decreases in v and in c1, while
F (ta12)− F (tb12) decreases in c2 and increases in v and in c1.
Proof. The non-discriminating monopolist maximizes π(t12) = F (t12)[(v −
c1 − (c2 − c1)t12] over t12. If this problem has an interior solution ta12 then it
satisfies v−c1 = (c2−c1)[ta12+F (ta12)/f(ta12)], where f(.) stands for the density
function associated with the concave c.d.f. F (.). Therefore, ta12 increases in v
and in c1, and it decreases in c2. The discriminating monopolist maximizes
π(t12) = F (t12)[(v − c1 − (c2 − c1)t12] + [1− F (ta12)](v − c2) = v − c2 + (c2 −
c1)(1 − t12)t12F (t12) over t12. The solution to this problem, denoted by tb12,
depends only on F (.), and not on v, c2, c1. Thus, 1−F (ta12) increases in c2 and
decreases in v and in c1, while F (ta12)− F (tb12) decreases in c2 and increases
in v and in c1.
The following examples illustrates the result
Example 1 Suppose the distribution function F (.) is given by F (x) = x1/y
for y = 1, 2, ... Then∆a12 = y(v−c1)/(y+1), ∆b12 = [y(v−c1)+(v−c2)]/(y+1),
ta12 = (v− c1)/[(y+1)(c2− c1)], tb12 = 1/(y+1), and ta12− tb12 = (v− c2)/[(y+
1)(c2 − c1)]. So, if vˆ = 12, c2 = 5, c1 = 2, c = 4 and y = 1 (implying that
F (.) is the uniform distribution) then the non-price-discriminating expert
will serve all consumers efficiently under the equal mark-up tariff ∆a1,2 = 3
(ta12 = 1). If she is allowed to price-discriminate then she serves half of the
population under the equal mark-up vector ∆b1,2 = 4.5 (tb12 = 0.5), and the rest
under the ‘overtreatment tariff’ ∆b0,2 = 3.25 So, with this parameter constel-
lation welfare is definitely decreasing when moving from non-discrimination
to discrimination because under nondiscrimination all consumers are treated
efficiently (W a = 4.5) whereas with discrimination customers in the inter-
val t ∈ (0.5, 1] are potentially overtreated, i.e., they receive with probability
(1−t) an unnecessary expensive treatment (W b = 4.125). If c2 increases from
5 to 7 then the non-price-discriminating expert serves 60% of the consumers
efficiently (ta12 = 6/10) and the rest remains unserved. With this constella-
tion welfare is higher under discrimination (W b = 2.875) than under non-
discrimination (W a = 2.7) because the gain of customers not treated under
25Note that ∆a12 = ∆b02 is due to the fact hat gt2 has full support on [0, 1] and that
parameters are such that all consumers are treated under non-discrimination. Whenever
some customers remain untreated under non-discrimination, mark-ups differ. Also, if gt2
< 1 for all t then ∆a12 6= ∆b02.
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non-discrimination (those in the interval (0.6, 1]) outweights the loss of con-
sumers that are efficiently served under non-discrimination and inefficiently
under discrimination (those in the interval (0.5, 0.6]).26 Similarly, if we start
from the same starting point and reduce v from 8 to 6 then the non-price-
discriminating expert serves 66% of the consumers efficiently (ta12 = 2/3)
and the rest remains unserved. Again, welfare is higher under discrimina-
tion (W b = 2.125) than under non-discrimination (W a = 2).
4 Extensions and Modifications
In this section we discuss several extensions/modifications. First, we ex-
tend the basic model to allow for an arbitrary number of problems and an
arbitrary number of interventions. It turns out that our main result that
price discrimination entails potential overtreatment of high-cost consumers
extends in this direction. Next we modify our basic model to a setting where
consumers differ not in the expected cost of efficient treatment but rather in
their valuation for a successful intervention. We show that in this setting the
expert provides serious diagnosis and appropriate treatment only to high-
valuation consumers while low-valuation ones are potentially undertreated;
that is, they are induced to demand a simple procedure without a serious
diagnosis. Finally we look at a setting in which consumers differ in both di-
mensions, in their expected cost of efficient treatment and in their valuation
of a successful intervention. It turns out that the expert will always serve at
least some consumers efficiently. The rest may get unnecessary or insufficient
procedures or no treatment at all.
4.1 More than Two Degrees of Problem Different De-
grees of Overtreatment
In this subsection we extend our analysis to n > 2 degrees of problem
(k ∈ {1, .., n}).We denote the type of procedure that efficiently fixes a prob-
lem of degree k by ck. Without loss of generality we assume that if k < l
then problem k is less severe than problem l. Again we assume that a less
severe problem is less costly to be treated (ck < cl for k < l) and that a
26Here note that the efficiency gain of treating a type t consumer under ∆12 is v − Ct,
while the efficiency gain of (over-)treating a type t customer under ∆02 is v − Ct − (1 −
t)(c2 − c1).
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more expensive treatment fixes all problems cheaper treatments fix, while
the cheapest one is only good for the least severe problem. As in the basic
model each consumer is characterized by his type t and a type t consumer has
probability gtk = g
t(ck) ≥ 0 of needing treatment ck, with
Pn
k=1 g
t
k = 1. Let
Gt(.) be the associated c.d.f., i.e., Gt(cl) =
Pl
k=1 g
t(ck). Also, let Ct denote
the associated expected cost of efficient treatment, i.e., Ct =
Pn
k=1 g
t
kck. For
the formal analysis we need some structure on the type set. What we want to
have is (i) a continuum of types, (ii) for each type t a strictly positive prob-
ability of having a problem of degree k (= 1, ...., n), and (iii) an ordering on
the type set such that for any two types s and t with s ≤ t the probability of
having a problem of at least degree k is higher under Gt(.) than under Gs(.)
for every degree of problem. A simple way to get such a structure is to take
two c.d.f.s G1(.) and G0(.) with densities g1(.) and g0(.) that have full sup-
port on {c1, ..., cn} such that the former first-order stochastically dominates
the latter (i.e., 1−G1(.) > 1−G0(.) for all ck, or equivalently G1(.) < G0(.)
for all ck), and to let the c.d.f. of problem degrees for a type t consumer
be given by Gt(.) = (1 − t)G0(.) + tG1(.). In the sequel we follow this way
and assume that consumers’ types are drawn independently from the same
distribution F (·), with differentiable strictly positive density f (·) on [0, 1].
Again, F (·) is assumed to be common knowledge, but a consumer’s type is
the consumer’s private information.
In an n ≥ 2 framework there are 2n − 1 classes of tariffs to consider, the
class of equal mark-up tariffs (denoted by ∆1,2,...,n−1,n) and 2n − 2 classes
of tariffs that have a lower mark-up for at least one and at most n − 1
treatments. We denote tariffs that have a lower mark-up for treatment k
by ∆1,..,k−1,0,k+1,...,n.27 For instance, for n = 3, a ∆103 vector has p1 − c1 =
p3 − c3 > p2 − c2. Similarly, for n = 4, a ∆0004 tariff has p4 − c4 > pk − ck
for k = 1, 2, 3. The expert’s behavior under the n classes of ∆0,..,0,k,0,..,0 tar-
iffs and under ∆1,2,...,n−1,n is obvious. She will always provide treatment k
under tariffs in the former classes, and she will always provide the appropri-
ate treatment under tariffs in the latter class. What about the rest? Our
assumption that the expert acts in her customers’ interest whenever she is
indifferent implies that she uses the cheapest highest mark-up treatment that
fixes the problem whenever such a treatment exists. If none of the highest
27Note the slight change in the ∆-notation When we consider an arbitrary number n of
problems we insert commas between the different treatments to avoid confusion; that is, we
write ∆1,2,...,n−1,n instead of ∆12...n−1n and ∆1,..,k−1,0,k+1,...,n instead of ∆1...k−10k+1...n.
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mark-up treatments fixes the problem, then the expert provides the cheapest
highest mark-up treatment. For instance, under ∆0,..,0,k,0,..,0,l,0,..0 the expert
will provide procedure ck for problem degrees h ≤ k, procedure cl for problem
degrees h ∈ {k + 1, .., l}, and again procedure k for problem degrees h > l.
Given these specifications the net utilities of consumers under all possible
tariffs are well defined and we can try to extend the arguments for the n = 2
to the n > 2 case. As is easily verified, Proposition 1 continues to hold if we
replace the condition c2− c1 > (v− c2)f(1) by C1−C0 > (v−C1)f(1). The
result of Proposition 2 generalizes as follows to the n > 2 case
Proposition 4 Consider the extended basic model with n ≥ 2 degrees of
problem and with consumers who differ in their probabilities of needing dif-
ferent procedures only. Suppose that some consumers remain unserved under
the conditions of Proposition 1 (where the expert is restricted to post a single
tariff only).28 Then, in any PBE of the game in which price discrimination
is permitted, the expert will post a menu in which at least two tariffs attract
types, one with equal mark-ups, and at least one tariff with lower mark-ups
for cheaper treatments.29 In total all consumers are served. Low cost con-
sumers are served under the former tariff and always get honest diagnosis
and appropriate treatment, high-cost consumers are served under (one of)
the latter(s) and are never under- but sometimes overtreated.
Proof. The proof parallels that of Proposition 2 and is available on request.
Proposition 4 confirms that our main result that price discrimination en-
tails potential overtreatment of high-cost consumers extends to the setting
with n > 2 degrees of problem Again, low-cost consumers are efficiently
served under an equal mark-up tariff and the rest of the market gets unnec-
essary procedures with strictly positive probability. Also again, no kind of
undertreatment is observed in equilibrium; that is, under all tariffs offered,
each customer will always get an intervention that fixes his problem.
The most important change when moving from the two to the more than
two types of problem setting is that there is no longer a guarantee that the
28In opposition to the basic model this condition is needed to make sure that price
discrimination is observed in equilibrium. The reason is, that in the current setting the
boundary solution has ∆1,2,...,n−1,n = v−C1 > v− cn, while the boundary solution in the
basic model has ∆12 = v − C1 = v − c2.
29Again, the menu may contain some redundant tariffs too, i.e., some tariffs that attract
no consumers.
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Figure 4: Type Dependent Expected Utilities under Ct =
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price-discriminating expert will post exactly two tariffs, one with equal mark-
ups and one with a higher mark-up for the most advanced intervention. The
only guarantee we have is that the expert will post in addition to the equal
mark-up tariff at least one other tariff, and that each posted contract other
than the equal mark-up tariff will provide the expert with incentives to never
under- and to sometimes overtreat customers (i.e., the intervention provided
is always sufficient to fix the problem but sometimes a more expensive inter-
vention is provided when a cheaper one would have been sufficient to solve
the problem). To get sharper results we would need more information on the
shape of the distribution functions and on the cost differential between the
different treatments. To see why, look at Figure 4. This figure illustrates the
n = 3 case. Let us start with a non-discrimination setting in which low-cost
consumers (with t ≤ ta123) are efficiently served under the equal mark-up tariff
∆123 while high-cost consumers (with t > ta123) remain untreated. If we now
introduce a ∆003 tariff that leaves zero rents to customers (∆003 = v − c3)
then the expert’s profit is unambiguously increased. The reason is, that the
∆003 contract is flat in the expected-utility/type space; that is, it provides
the same utility to all consumers. So all consumers attracted by this contract
can be held to their reservation utility. Using a ∆023 tariff instead of ∆003
has one advantage and one disadvantage. The advantage is, that it is more
profitable than the ∆003 contract since it entails a smaller inefficiency. The
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disadvantage is that the tariff is not flat; that is, it offers rents to lower cost
consumers. So some consumers (in the figure the market segment [tb123, ta123])
who would choose the equal mark-up tariff∆123 under the two contract menu
(∆123, ∆003) will switch to the less profitable ∆023 contract if this tariff is also
available. (Here notice that if ∆123, ∆023 and ∆003 attract types, then ∆123 >
∆023 > ∆003.) So, whether it is profitable to post the ∆023 tariff in addition
to (or instead of) the ∆003 contract depends on the magnitude of the two
effects, and the magnitude of the two effects depends on the shape of G0(.),
G1(.) and F (.) and on whether the cost differential ck+1− ck is increasing or
decreasing in k.
4.2 Differences in the Valuation Undertreatment
Up to now we have investigated settings where consumers differ in their
probabilities of needing different treatments only. Now we modify our as-
sumptions and analyze a model where consumers differ in their valuation of
a successful intervention vˆ, but have the same probabilities of needing dif-
ferent procedures. More precisely, we assume that a consumer of type t has
valuation vˆt = vˆ−t and that consumers’ types are drawn independently from
the same concave c.d.f. F (·), with differentiable strictly positive density f (·)
on
£
0, t
¤
. Again, F (·) is assumed to be common knowledge, but a consumer’s
type is the consumer’s private information.
With this specification a type t consumer’s expected utility under ∆12 is
vt − C − ∆12, where vt = vˆt − c. Similarly, a type t consumer’s expected
utility under ∆02 is vt − C −∆02 − g1(c2 − c1). Finally, a type t consumer’s
expected utility under ∆10 is vt − C −∆10 − g2(bvt − c2 + c1).
As is easily verified, Proposition 1 continues to hold if we replace the
condition c2 − c1 > (v − c2)f(1) by (vt − C)f(t) < 1. Proposition 2 changes
to
Proposition 5 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
two treatment qualities. Suppose that consumers differ in their valuation of a
successful intervention vˆ (rather than in their probabilities of needing different
treatments). Then, if price discrimination is observed in equilibrium, it is
performed via a menu containing two tariffs, one with equal mark-ups, and
one where the mark up for the minor intervention exceeds that for the major
one. High valuation consumers are served under the former tariff and always
get serious diagnosis and appropriate treatment; lower valuation consumers
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are served under the latter and always get the minor treatment, sometimes
inefficiently.
Proof. First observe that any arbitrary menu of tariffs partitions the type-
set into (at most) three subintervals delimited by cut-off values t02, t12 and
t10 with 0 ≤ t02, t12 ≤ t10 ≤ 1 and either t02 = 0 or t12 = 0 (or both) such
that (i) either the optimal strategy of types in [0, t02) is to choose a ∆02 tariff
(if t02 > 0), or the optimal strategy of types in [0, t12) is to choose a ∆12 tariff
(if t12 > 0), (ii) the optimal strategy of types in (t12, t10) is to decide for a∆10
tariff, and (iii) the optimal strategy of types in (t10, 1] is to remain untreated.
This follows from the fact that the expected utility under any of these tariffs
is strictly decreasing in t, and from the fact that the∆12 and the∆02 function
have exactly the same steepness in the expected-utility/type space and that
they are both strictly steeper than the∆10 function (see Figure 5 below). The
rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 the only exception being
that the ∆10 function is not completely flat so that price discrimination may
not be observed in equilibrium even if some consumers are excluded under
the conditions of Proposition 1 (where the expert is restricted to post a single
tariff only).
Proposition 5 tells us that in the model where consumers differ in their
valuation for a successful intervention but have the same expected cost of
efficient treatment, price discrimination entails potential undertreatment of
low-valuation consumers.
An explanation is easily provided. Since consumers are homogeneous in
the expected cost of efficient treatment an overtreatment tariff, if attractive
for low-valuation consumers, will also attract high-valuation ones and hence
cannot be used for discriminatory purposes.30 An undertreatment tariff, on
the other hand, is unattractive for high-valuation consumers because they
have more to lose if the procedure fails. It is therefore potentially, but not
necessarily, useful for discrimination.
Figure 5 provides an explanation for why in the heterogeneity-in-the-
valuation-case price discrimination is not necessarily observed in equilibrium
even if some consumers are excluded under non-discrimination If we start
with a non-discriminating setting in which the expert posts an equal mark-
30Referring to Figure 5, one can observe that the ∆02 and the ∆12 tariff have the same
steepness in the expected-utility-type space. Given that the mark-up of the ∆02 tariff
needs to be lower than the mark-up of the ∆12 tariff to attract some customers, ∆02
tariffs are strictly dominated.
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Figure 5: Type Dependent Expected Utilities with vt = v − t
up tariff∆12 only, and introduce∆10 as a second tariff then the expert profits
because some new consumers (those in the interval [ta12, tb10]) are attracted.
At the same time the expert loses because some consumers (those in the
interval [tb12, ta12]) who used to buy under the more profitable equal mark-up
tariff ∆12 switch to the less profitable ∆10 tariff. Whether the overall effect
is positive or negative depends on parameter constellations, that is, on the
shape of the distribution function F (.), on the size of the valuation vˆ and on
the intervention costs c1 and c2.
4.3 Two Dimensional Type Set Over- and Undertreat-
ment
Our previous results suggest that in a setting with a two-dimensional type
set over- and undertreatment might coexist in equilibrium. This is indeed the
case as the (discrete) example below shows. Before considering this example
we first show that even in a two-dimensional world the expert will always
treat at least a subset of consumers efficiently.
Proposition 6 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
two treatment qualities. Suppose that consumers differ in their valuation of
a successful intervention and in their probabilities of needing different treat-
ments. Further suppose that each consumer has a strictly positive probability
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of having each of the different problems.31 Then, in any PBE the expert will
post a menu in which an equal mark-up tariff attracts a non-empty subset of
types.
Proof. Suppose there is no equal mark-up tariff which attracts a strictly
positive measure of types. Then, among the tariffs chosen by a strictly posi-
tive measure of types, take the one with the highest mark-up for the provided
treatment and denote it by ∆h. Two cases have to be distinguished
If ∆h is of the ∆02 variety denote the type with the highest g2 among the
types attracted by ∆h by th. Then replace ∆h by a ∆12-tariff such that type
th is exactly indifferent between ∆h and ∆12; that is, ∆12 = ∆h+gth1 (c2−c1).
Since consumers with a lower g2 gain more by the replacement than the
critical type th, all types attracted by ∆h under the original menu will be
attracted by ∆12 under the new menu. Types not attracted by ∆h under
the original menu will either switch to the more profitable ∆12 tariff or will
choose the same tariff as before the replacement. Thus, since ∆12 > ∆h the
new menu yields a strictly higher profit.
If ∆h is of the ∆10 variety denote the type with the lowest g2(bv− c2+ c1)
among the types attracted by ∆h by th. Then replace ∆h by a ∆12-tariff
such that type th is exactly indifferent between ∆h and ∆12; that is, ∆12 =
∆h+gth2 (bvth+ c− c2+ c1). Since consumers with a higher g2(bv− c2+ c1) gain
more by the replacement than the marginal type th, all types attracted by∆h
under the original menu will be attracted by ∆12 under the new menu. Types
not attracted by ∆h under the original menu will either switch to the more
profitable ∆12 tariff or will choose the same tariff as before the replacement.
Thus, since ∆12 > ∆h the new menu yields a strictly higher profit.32
Let us now discuss the example announced earlier. In this example all
consumers are efficiently served under equal mark-up prices if the expert can
post a single tariff only. With price discrimination the expert uses a ∆12-
tariff to skim-off high-valuation/low-cost consumers, a ∆10-tariff to under-
31If consumers need the cheap procedure for sure (gt1 = 1) then the tariffs ∆10 and
∆12 are indistinguishable from an efficiency point of view. Similarly, for consumers who
need the expensive treatment for sure (gt2 = 1) ∆02 and ∆12 are indistinguishable from
an efficiency point of view. So, to guarantee that the expert will post a menu in which an
equal mark-up tariff attracts a nonempty subset of types at least some consumers must
have gt1 ∈ (0, 1).
32Here notice that the same proof-technique could be used to prove that the result
continues to hold if we allow for an arbitrary number of problems and an arbitrary number
of interventions.
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treat low-valuation/low-cost consumers, and a ∆02-tariff to overtreat high-
valuation/high-cost consumers. Low-valuation/high-cost consumers remain
unserved with price discrimination although treating them would be efficient.
Example 2 There are two degrees of problem (n = 2). Each consumer is
characterized by his two-dimensional type (gt2,bvt). Consumers’ types are in-
dependently drawn from an equal probability distribution on the discrete sup-
port {(0.5, 2.8) , (0.2, 2.8) , (0.9, 4.0) , (0.5, 4.5)}. Each consumer’s sunk cost
is one (c = 1), the cost of the expensive treatment is one (c2 = 1), and the
cost of the cheap treatment is zero (c1 = 0). If the expert can post a single
tariff only, then she efficiently serves all consumers under the equal mark-up
contract ∆12 = 1.3. With this policy she earns an expected profit of 1.3 per
consumer. If the expert can price discriminate among consumers then she
increases her expected profit to 1.425 per consumer by posting three price vec-
tors, the equal mark-up tariff ∆12 = 2.5, the ‘overtreatment tariff’ ∆02 = 2.0,
and the ‘undertreatment tariff’ ∆10 = 1.2. (0.5, 4.5)-consumers are served ef-
ficiently under the equal mark-up tariff, (0.9, 4.0)-consumers are potentially
overtreated under ∆02, (0.2, 2.8)-consumers are potentially undertreated un-
der ∆10, and (0.5, 2.8)-consumers remain untreated.
5 Discussion
In this section we revisit some of the modelling assumptions and discuss alter-
natives. We also re-interpret the different tariffs offered in the single-expert
model as different distribution channels chosen by a monopolistic manufac-
turer.
The diagnosis cost
The model assumes that the expert can identify the correct service without
incurring any cost. The justification for assuming zero diagnosis cost is that,
if the expert finds it profitable to refrain from providing diagnosis to some
consumers when diagnosis costs are zero, then, a forteriori, she will do so
with positive diagnosis costs. So, in studying price discrimination, there is
no loss of generality in this assumption. Assuming zero diagnosis costs has
also expositional advances With a strictly positive diagnosis cost we would
have to define — and concentrate on — parameter constellations for which
performing a serious diagnosis and providing the diagnosed treatment is the
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efficient policy.33 This would complicate the analysis without altering the
results.
Consumers’ sunk cost
The basic model of Section 2 assumes that each consumer incurs a sunk cost
c ≥ c2 − c1 if he visits the expert independently of whether he is actually
treated or not.34 This assumption has the effect that a consumer’s option
to reject a recommended treatment doesn’t impose a binding constraint on
the expert’s maximization problem. To see this, consider the basic model
of Section 2 and suppose that the ex post participation constraint is not
binding. Then, the maximal profit the expert can realize from serving a type
t consumer with equal mark-up prices is v − (1 − t)c1 − tc2 (otherwise the
consumer would refrain from visiting the expert) while equal mark-up prices
require p2−c2 = p1−c1. Thus, p2 = c2+v−(1−t)c1−tc2 = v+(1−t)(c2−c1).
Now, from c ≥ c2 − c1 it follows that p2 < vˆ = v + c so that the ex post
participation constraint is indeed not binding. If we allowed for c < c2 − c1
then there could be parameter constellations for which the restriction p2 ≤
vˆ = v + c becomes binding. In this case, the largest surplus that could be
extracted with an equal mark-up tariffwould be (1−t)[v+c−(c2−c1)]+t(v+c)
leading to a profit of (1−t)[v+c−(c2−c1)−c1]+t(v+c−c2) = v+c−c2. This
profit is larger than the profit attainable with an overtreatment tariff (which
is v − c2) whenever c > 0. Thus, allowing for c < c2 − c1 would complicate
the analysis without providing different results (provided c > 0).
An alternative interpretation of the model
The model and the analysis were developed in the context of a monopolistic
expert who second degree price-discriminates among consumers via a menu
of tariffs. Here, we argue that it is possible to re-interpret this scenario and
the results we obtained in terms of a monopolistic manufacturer who uses
different distribution channels as an instrument of price discrimination. A
simple re-interpretation of the results of the basic model — where the ex-
pert posts an equal mark-up tariff to skim-off low-cost consumers and an
33For instance, in the basic version of the model — where there are only two types
of problem and two types of treatment — performing a serious diagnosis and providing
the diagnosed treatment is the efficient policy if and only if the diagnosis cost d satisfies
d ≤ min{(1− g2)(c2 − c1), g2(vˆ − c2 + c1)}.
34In Subsection 4.2 — where consumers differ in their gross valuation vˆ but have the
same g2 — the relevant condition is c ≥ (1− g2)(c2 − c1).
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overtreatment tariff to serve the rest — is that the monopolistic manufacturer
sets up two types of stores, specialist outlets through which she distributes
the entire assortment and where the qualifications and incentives of the sales
personnel are such that they diagnose customers’ needs and suggest the right
equipment; and discount outlets through which she distributes only the ma-
jor treatment. This story is not very realistic, however. A more elaborate
model would have a monopolistic manufacturer that distributes her products
through a competitive retail stage. The simplest version of such a model
would have two types of retailers, expert shops with highly qualified sales
personnel, and discounters. Suppose that there are at least two retailers of
each of these two types in the market. Further suppose that the manufac-
turer’s products are only a small part of a much larger number of products
handled by a typical retailer so that the manufacturer can treat the charac-
teristics of the retail stage as given.35 Then the manufacturer can mimic the
single-expert behavior by the choice of different distribution channels. To see
this, suppose that the manufacturer wants to skim-off low-cost consumers via
the ∆12-tariff (p1 = c1+∆12, p2 = c2+∆12) and serve the rest of the market
with the ∆02-tariff (p1 < c1+∆02, p2 = c2+∆02). How can she do this? She
offers the two treatments at wholesale prices we1 = c1+∆12 and we2 = c2+∆12
to at least two expert shops and she offers only the major treatment at the
wholesale price wd2 = c2 +∆02 to at least two discounters. With at least two
discounters carrying the major treatment, market equilibrium yields pd2 = wd2
by the usual price-undercutting argument. And expert retailers? Were an
expert to post prices violating the equal mark-up rule, consumers would be-
come suspicious; they would correctly infer that the expert will either always
recommend the major treatment (if pe1−we1 < pe2−we2), or always recommend
the minor one (if pe1−we1 > pe2−we2), and they would adjust their willingness
to pay accordingly. So, experts cannot gain from cheating. Consequently, at
least two experts post tariffs that induce non-fraudulent behavior. With tar-
iffs that induce non-fraudulent behavior, Bertrand competition again yields
prices such that underbidding yields losses and charging more implies a loss
of customers; that is, pe1 − we1 = pe2 − we2 = 0.
Note that here again the sunk cost c plays an important role in making
the story consistent For small enough c (c < pe2 − pd2) experts would become
vulnerable to competition by discounters. Why? Because discounters would
then be able to attract consumers who have learned from an expert that
35Marvel and McCafferty (1984) make a similar assumption in a different context.
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they need a high quality treatment. To avoid this, the manufacturer would
have to reduce we2 accordingly. The rest of the story is the same as that
in the basic model (discussed in the previous paragraph) The profitability of
price discrimination would be reduced but price discrimination would remain
profitable as long as c > 0.36
6 Concluding Remarks
Research on credence goods markets typically assumes that consumers are
homogeneous. The present article has studied the consequences of dropping
this assumption in a model where an expert / a manufacturer has some de-
gree of market power in serving the market. With heterogeneous consumers
and market power price discrimination may emerge in equilibrium. We have
shown, that in the case of experts markets, price discrimination proceeds
along the dimension of quality of advice offered. High quality diagnosis and
appropriate treatment is sold to the most profitable market segment only.
Less profitable consumers are induced to demand a procedure without a se-
rious diagnosis. If consumers differ in the probability of needing different
interventions then low-cost consumers get high quality diagnosis and appro-
priate treatment while high-cost consumers are potentially overtreated; that
is, they are induced to demand high quality equipment without a serious
diagnosis. By contrast, under heterogeneity in the valuation of a successful
intervention high-valuation consumers get efficient diagnosis and appropri-
ate treatment, while low-valuation ones are potentially undertreated ; that
is, they are induced to demand low quality equipment independently of the
severity of their problem.
While the equilibrium behavior outlined in the present paper is obviously
an abstraction and it is probably impossible to point out an industry that
features exactly this kind oft price discrimination, our results identify an ele-
ment that may be present in the conduct of many credence goods industries.
We discussed the evolution of the IT industry in the introduction. Other cre-
dence goods markets with similar characteristics — large heterogeneity in con-
sumers’ valuation for a successful match in the beginning; large heterogeneity
in the product quality with product maturation — featured a similar evolution.
Examples are fitness equipment, for example treadmills. At the beginning
advanced machines where only available through specialized stores that also
36Here, remember that in the optimal menu of Section 3 ∆02 = v.
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offered advice in choosing the right equipment, whereas simpler equipment
was sold at warehouse outlets. Nowadays, advanced equipment is available
from discounters. Similarly, better makes of digital cameras were first sold by
expert stores only, whereas now, also discount outlets offer advanced digital
photo equipment. Digital hearing aids, stereo equipment, functional sports
ware and even eyeglasses experienced a similar history.
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